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Community law is enforced by two sets of courts; those of the Member States, and 
those of the Community. The rhetoric surrounding this is of co-operation. 
Nevertheless, any sharing of function is also a sharing of power, and unless the 
boundaries are permanently fixed, there will also be the potential for competition. 
That may be more apparent, and more discussed, in the context of the other organs of 
government; the two sets of civil servants, in national ministries and the Commission, 
the two sets of parliamentarians, and the cabinet-like Council and its national 
equivalents. However, it is also true of courts. 
It is true that courts are different: unlike other organs, they do not directly 
reflect the current will of government or parliament, and this means that the division 
of powers between them is less obviously a democratic or political issue. However, in 
a careful sense of both those words it clearly is. Courts reflect the societies in which 
they sit, and are formed by them. They are another branch of democracy, another way 
of reflecting the people, and, of course, all power is political. 
As a consequence, courts have a dual role in the allocation of competences in 
the Community. They adjudicate it, but they are also an important part of it. They 
must decide, but they must also decide whether they should decide. This paper 
focuses on how the Court of Justice does the second of these things. It does this 
through an examination of the Court’s behaviour during the preliminary reference 
procedure. It asks how the Court interprets its own function in that procedure, and its 
relationship with national courts, and so in turn their function. The emphasis is on 
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whether the Court is right to take such an extensive view of its own competences, and 
in particular to delve into the facts of cases as much as it does, or whether it would be 
better for it to take a more abstract approach and leave more work for its national 
peers. 
These questions are asked for a number of reasons. In part there is the desire to 
study an emerging Community legal system, and its character, and to see what and 
how much it owes to the Member States legal systems, and in particular the common 
and civil law traditions and concepts of law and judging. However, there is also the 
more practical concern to understand the consequences of different ways of 
interpreting Article 234, both for the legal systems and courts involved, and for the 
Community policies that they are called upon to adjudicate. 
Both of these are given impetus by the surprising absence of scholarship 
concerning these points.1 Perhaps for black-letter lawyers, used to examining 
judgments on their own terms, criticizing what they say or do not say, the question of 
whether they should be there at all seems unrealistic, and so of marginal importance, 
too theoretical, and even subversive or disrespectful. On the other hand, for political 
scientists, such meta-questions are interesting, but not always accessible. The 
argument in this paper is not built on the leading constitutional judgments, that are 
well-known even outside legal circles, but on sometimes mundane rulings in diverse 
policy areas, and the consistent patterns that emerge. These will only be apparent to 
the writer for whom these are his or her daily texts. 
After this introduction, the next section looks at the characteristics of the 
Community that give courts a prominent role, and argues that their potential freedom 
and power is far more than is customary within Member States. Hence the need to 
consider how that power will be divided up. The third section of the paper then 
outlines the relevant aspects of the preliminary reference procedure itself, and in 
particular the distinction between interpretation and application of the law. This is 
followed by a discussion, with reference to case law from the internal market, of how 
the Court interprets that distinction. Subsequent parts analyse the Court’s behaviour. 
First, why has it chosen for an interventionist interpretative path limiting the freedom 
of national courts and extending its own? The classical answer, its desire for 
uniformity of Community law is critically examined. Second, how much does it owe 
to tradition? It seems to display a very common law understanding of the law, and yet 
the reference procedure owes much to continental European systems. Both sides of 
this create problems. The common law is labour intensive, and demands 
decentralization of interpretative creativity. Resisting this, the Court of Justice creates 
a workload it cannot cope with. From the other side, the classically continental 
reference procedure is coherent where the higher court has competence to interpret all 
the laws that come before it. Lacking that, it court can not fully answer questions of 
conflicts of laws; yet that is what the Court of Justice, despite a lack of competence to 
interpret national law, insists it must do. 
Following this, a parallel is drawn between issues here and those surrounding 
regulatory competition. It suggests that as with its legislative competence, the 
Community attempts to define its powers in both an ambiguous and an extensive way, 
giving it the option of centralization, even if that option is not always exercised. It is 
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argued that this is inefficient, and creates an adjudicative system poorly adapted to a 
large and dynamic market. As with legislation, the risk of some loss of uniformity is 
more than outweighed by the huge waste of national resources entailed in infantilizing 
and marginalizing the role of national courts in interpreting Community law. Finally, 
in the last section before the conclusion, it is suggested that recasting the Court of 
Justice as the appeals court it almost is would solve some problems. 
 
2. THE JUDICIALISATION OF POLITICS AND THE ROLE OF COURTS IN THE 
COMMUNITY 
 
A fractious society creates irresolvable, constantly changing and dynamic questions. 
Consensus, where it exists, is often short lived and fragile. This requires similarly 
flexible and adaptable norms - interpretation is a faster, more subtle tool than 
legislation, as well as being perhaps more safely insulated from waves of populism – 
and a consequence is that the judiciary takes a greater role in the great political 
questions of the time. This is most evident in the United States, where the Supreme 
Court is one of the leading actors in that society’s self-formation.  
Three important elements in allowing such judicialisation to occur are the 
presence of a directly effective, legally enforceable constitution, precedent, and an 
explanatory and well-argued style of judgment. The first creates a basis for annulment 
of acts of public authorities, even of the legislator, and so creates a stage for direct 
conflict, for a battle of wills. Admittedly, interpretation without annulment can also be 
a powerful tool, but at least in the public perception it is likely to be less dramatic or 
controversial – there is no contest, but merely a legal point likely to be inaccessible to 
most. Moreover, constitutions typically contain rights and principles that are broad 
and open to debate – thus they effectively give a wide discretion to courts to challenge 
the legislator. They create a true opponent.  
Yet the battle is not the war, and while a decision in a specific case may have 
repercussions, few case-outcomes are in themselves enough to change the course of a 
society. No single law or individual, or group, is that essential. However, when the 
reasoning behind a decision is fully argued and laid out, and when that decision is 
binding on courts in the future, then the court does not just decide the case, but lays 
down a new rule for the future. Its judgment is then more far-reaching, and as a court 
builds up a body of such judicial legislation it does develop the power to steer the 
land.2 
 All these three elements have emerged in the European Union. The authority 
assumed by the Court of Justice to – effectively, in conjunction with national courts - 
annul national acts is well-known. Less often considered is the way the Court has 
developed a semi-discursive style of judgment, in which it not only lays down general 
principles to be followed in the future, but also provides reasons for these, and roots 
them in previous decisions. This legitimates the principles as new quasi-laws, and 
encourages national courts to accept them.3  
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 In fact, the potential power of courts in the Community legal order arguably 
goes beyond anything to be found in individual Member States. The language of the 
Treaties notoriously leaves ample room for interpretation. This is partly a function of 
their relative brevity, given the size of the tasks they delimit, but also of their 
purposive nature. Interpreting with a view to ends which are in themselves disputable 
adds a further level of ambiguity to already open-textured law. 
 This makes it perhaps strange that during the recent intense focus on a clearer 
and better division of powers little attention has been given to how the Court of 
Justice performs its tasks. Emphasis was instead on the description of Community 
powers as a way of containing them, and on supervision of subsidiarity; another 
indeterminate idea.4 Yet this creates at best an incomplete strategy. Concepts such as 
free movement and fair competition, even less a clean environment or a high level of 
consumer protection, can only be described in precise terms at the cost of excluding 
what are ongoing and important social dialogues about what such things are or should 
be. Working with living and changing concepts means having imprecise law.5 Thus 
rather than looking at the texts, a better, or at least a necessary additional, source of 
predictability and legal certainty is the behaviour of the courts who read them. If this 
follows accepted and known norms, then while the law may change, it does so in an 
understandable way.  
 
3. INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION IN THE PRELIMINARY 
REFERENCE PROCEDURE 
 
Certain types of legal action are reserved to the European Court of Justice, and 
national courts play no role. Here there is little to discuss concerning division of 
functions. That issue becomes important only in the context of preliminary references, 
which avoid a simple hierarchical relationship between courts, such as between 
deciding court and court of appeal, in favour of a co-operative sharing out of the 
various activities necessary to decide a case.6  
Article 234 EC provides that national courts may refer a question concerning 
the interpretation of the Treaty to the Court of Justice. The Court of Justice has 
limited this right to circumstances in which the answer to that question is necessary to 
decide a case currently before the national court. This idea of sending a question to 
another court has its origins in continental legal systems. A number of these have 
courts which are empowered to answer questions, often on the constitutionality of 
lower laws, but do not formally decide the case. There is also a similarity with courts 
of cassation. These are appeal courts, but once again they do not decide the case, but 
merely consider whether the lower court has correctly used the law. If they find it has 
not, they refer the case to be re-decided by the lower court, or another court of that 
level. They do not provide a replacement judgment.  
In both these cases there is a distinction made between interpreting and 
applying, or between law and fact. The higher body considers and interprets legal 
matters, but does not determine matters of fact, nor does it apply the law to the facts, 
which functions it leaves to the referring court, which decides the case and issues the 
operative judgment. This distinction also operates in Community law, and has been 
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expressed and repeated by the Court of Justice. It has jurisdiction to interpret the 
Treaties, it often emphasises, but not to apply that interpretation to the facts in the 
case, which task is the exclusive competence of the national referring court. 
Nevertheless, it remains far from obvious what this formula means, and what the 
difference between interpretation and application is.7  
Interpretation could be understood in an abstract sense. Then interpretations of 
Article 28 would include the famous proposition in Dassonville,8 as well as the 
finding in Cassis de Dijon9 that the application of formally equal national standards 
can be contrary to that article if disproportionate, and the suggestion in Keck10 that 
rules having no difference in their effect on imports and national goods are outside of 
Article 28 altogether.11 Application, the task of the national court, would then consist 
in applying these principles to the case – asking whether on the facts before them the 
national measure is proportionate, or whether it has an unequal effect on national and 
imported goods.  
However, interpretation can also be understood to go a great deal further. It 
could be understood to include assessment of the facts in the light of the law.12 Thus 
the concrete finding that the rule on alcohol levels under consideration in Cassis (or a 
rule of that form) is in fact disproportionate, or the finding in Keck that selling 
arrangements are in fact generally rules of equal effect, can also be seen as an 
interpretation of the Treaty in the particular case. On this reading, the application task 
left over to the national court is a mechanical, residual one. It is reduced to a primary 
fact-finder but with even that function limited, since certain factual questions – such 
as whether consumers may be confused – may be essentially redefined as questions of 
Community law, for the Court of Justice. Under such a view of interpretation, it could 
be said that Community law includes a degree of a priori fact finding.13  
 
4. THE COURT OF JUSTICE’S APPROACH 
 
The Court of Justice is quite consistent in its doctrine; application is for the national 
court, the only one competent to assess the facts, and the legality or proportionality of 
the particular national measure; “the court has no jurisdiction either to apply the 
Treaty to a specific case, or to decide upon the validity of a provision of domestic law 
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in relation to the Treaty”14; “it is for national courts alone to apply the provisions of 
Community law so interpreted, taking into account the circumstances of fact and law 
in the case which has come before it. No such application is possible without a 
comprehensive appraisal of the facts of the case”15; “Article 177 ... does not give the 
Court jurisdiction to take cognizance of the facts of the case”;16  Yet at the same time, 
the Court will reject questions that do not provide sufficient factual information, and 
emphasizes that it can only deal with references where the context is made very 
clear.17 Moreover, it is well-known that it often delivers judgments so specific that the 
case is effectively decided, in which it rules unambiguously on matters of fact.18 
 This does seem to disclose some flexibility of approach, which is deserving of 
analysis in itself.19 However the examples below show what perhaps does not need to 
be shown – that when it wants to the Court considers itself quite competent to engage 
with the facts, and take a very broad view of interpretation indeed.20 
    
4.1 Free Movement 
 
 The most startling and consistent specificity comes in the application of the 
free movement articles, notably those governing goods and services. The abstract 
principles developed by the Court in this area are really quite simple, and could be 
summed up in a few paragraphs, but the considerable and growing body of case law is 
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at 548. 
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mainly concerned with endless specific applications of these principles, with the 
deciding of a repetitive stream of formally similar cases. 
 The most obvious example is the case law following Cassis. That case made 
clear that Article 28 forbade the use of national standards to exclude imports, unless 
those standards served some legitimate aim (i.e. were not merely protectionist or cost-
saving) and their application to imports was proportionate – genuinely necessary for 
that aim, not going beyond what was necessary, and not resulting in 
disproportionately heavy disadvantages for the importer compared with the claimed 
benefits for the consumer or society in general. The overwhelming majority of cases 
on standards and product rules ever since have been requests for the Court of Justice 
to consider a particular national measure in the light of these principles. The question 
usually comes down to ‘is the national measure proportionate?’  
 Of course, proportionality can be seen as a question of Community law, and so 
the determination of whether a measure is proportionate as a legitimate element of 
interpreting that law. There are two problems with this. One is that the Court of 
Justice has stated in terms of varying certainty that the proportionality of national 
measures is a question of fact, for the national court21 – thereby contradicting its own 
practice – and the other is that this must, at least in part, be the case; any sensible 
assessment of whether a measure really goes beyond what is necessary, or what its 
effects are, requires a good factual investigation of the type that the Court of Justice is 
neither competent nor able to perform on a reference.22 If it attempts to, the result is 
often an answer that betrays a half-understanding of the factual situation, and yet no 
hesitation in drawing sweeping conclusions about it.23  
 A vivid example is Buet.24 A quotation, though lengthy, is worthwhile: 
11    It is common ground that the French legislature adopted the prohibition of 
canvassing in question out of concern to protect consumers against the risk of ill-
considered purchases. However, as the Court has repeatedly held (see in particular the 
judgment of 14 July 1988 in Case 407/85 Glocken) such rules must be proportionate to 
the goals pursued, and if a Member State has at its disposal less restrictive means of 
obtaining the same goals, it is under an obligation to make use of them.  
12    In that respect canvassing at private dwellings exposes the potential customer to the 
risk of making an ill-considered purchase. To guard against that risk it is normally 
sufficient to ensure that purchasers have the right to cancel a contract concluded in their 
home.  
13    It is necessary, however, to point out that there is greater risk of an ill-considered 
purchase when the canvassing is for enrolment for a course of instruction or the sale of 
educational material. The potential purchaser often belongs to a category of people who, 
for one reason or another, are behind with their education and are seeking to catch up. 
That makes them particularly vulnerable when faced with salesmen of educational 
material who attempt to persuade them that if they use that material they will have better 
employment prospects. Moreover, as is apparent from the documents, it is as a result of 
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 Case C-145/88 Torfaen Borough Council [1989] ECR I-3851; Case C-169/91 Stoke on Trent City 
Council [1992] ECR I-6635. See also Case C-95/01 Greenham and Abel, 5th February 2004; Case C-
368/95 Familiapress [1997] ECR I-3689; Case C-312/89 SIDEF [1991] ECR I-997; Case C-405/98 
Gourmet International [2001] ECR I-1795. See also notes 27 and 31 below. 
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 See M.Jarvis Application of EC law on the Free Movement of Goods by the National Courts of 
Member States (PhD thesis, Groningen, 1997) at 185-189 and 211-218. 
23
 Ibid, at 186. 
24
 Case 382/87 Buet v Ministère Public [1989] ECR 1235. 
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numerous complaints caused by such abuses, such as the sale of out-of-date courses, that 
the legislature enacted the ban on canvassing at issue.  
14    Finally, it needs to be stressed that since teaching is not a consumer product in daily 
use, an ill-considered purchase could cause the purchaser harm other than mere financial 
loss that could be longer lasting. Thus it has to be acknowledged that the purchase of 
unsuitable or low-quality material could compromise the consumer's chances of obtaining 
further training and thus consolidating his position on the labour market.  
15    In those circumstances it is permissible for the national legislature of the Member 
State to consider that giving consumers a right of cancellation is not sufficient protection 
and that it is necessary to ban canvassing at private dwellings.  
The first paragraph is interpretation. The rest is a somewhat shallow – in that without 
reference to evidence or counter argument - judgment on the facts. Even if the Court 
felt paragraph 11 alone did not give enough guidance, it could have then instructed 
the national court that the Treaty required it to consider all relevant characteristics, 
such as the particular categories of persons making a purchase, and any special 
circumstances attaching to the type of goods. The risk would still have been there of a 
different answer at national level, but such abstract guidance might have been of 
much more help to other courts.25 
 Clinique follows in the same tradition.26 The question referred was whether a 
German prohibition on the use of that name on cosmetics could be justified by the fact 
that the word bore a resemblance to the German word for hospital, and therefore 
might confuse consumers into thinking that the products had some medical value. The 
answer might have been ‘it could be, if it does have that effect on a reasonably 
cautious consumer’. Instead the Court said 
16    It should also be recalled that the Court has consistently held that rules must be 
proportionate to the goals pursued (see, in particular, the judgment in Case 382/87 Buet v 
Ministère Public [1989] ECR 1235, paragraph 11).  
17    The German legislation which transposed Article 6(2) of Directive 76/768 must in its 
application be consistent with Articles 30 and 36 of the Treaty, as interpreted in the 
Court's case-law. In order to reply to the national court's question, it is necessary to 
determine in the light of the criteria set out in that case-law whether Community law 
precludes the prohibition referred to in that question.  
……………. 
20    In order to determine whether, in preventing a product being attributed with 
characteristics which it does not have, the prohibition of the use of the name " Clinique" 
for the marketing of cosmetic products in the Federal Republic of Germany can be 
justified by the objective of protecting consumers or the health of humans, it is necessary 
to take into account the information set out in the order of reference.  
21    In particular, it is apparent from that information that the range of cosmetic products 
manufactured by the Estée Lauder company is sold in the Federal Republic of Germany 
exclusively in perfumeries and cosmetic departments of large stores, and therefore none 
of those products is available in pharmacies. It is not disputed that those products are 
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 See note 81 below. 
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 Case C-316/92 Clinique Laboratoires [1994] ECR I-317. 
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presented as cosmetic products and not as medicinal products. It is not suggested that, 
apart from the name of the products, this presentation does not comply with the rules 
applicable to cosmetic products. Finally, according to the very wording of the question 
referred, those products are ordinarily marketed in other countries under the name 
"Clinique" and the use of that name apparently does not mislead consumers.  
22    In the light of these facts, the prohibition of the use of that name in the Federal 
Republic of Germany does not appear necessary to satisfy the requirements of consumer 
protection and the health of humans.  
23    The clinical or medical connotations of the word "Clinique" are not sufficient to 
make that word so misleading as to justify the prohibition of its use on products marketed 
in the aforesaid circumstances.  
What is interesting in this extract is that the Court explicitly states that in order to 
answer the question it must decide whether the national legislation actually 
contravenes Article 28. The implication is that this is what its function is.27 Contrast 
with this statement from Frattelli Graffione,28 also on the question of a consumer 
confusion; 
 
23    However, as pointed out in paragraph 17 of this judgment, in order to be justified, 
the measure adopted to protect consumers must really be necessary for that purpose and 
proportionate to the objective pursued, which must not be capable of being achieved by 
measures which are less restrictive of intra-Community trade.  
24    According to the case-law of the Court, the risk of misleading consumers cannot 
override the requirements of the free movement of goods and so justify barriers to trade, 
unless that risk is sufficiently serious (see to that effect, in particular, the judgments in the 
Clinique and Mars cases, cited above).  
25    Since the documents before the Court in this case do not enable it to assess whether 
those conditions are satisfied here, it is for the national court to carry out that assessment.  
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 Contrary to the arguments of the Advocate General, supported by Advocate General Fennelly in 
Case 220/98 Estee Lauder [2000] ECR I-117; ‘I would recommend that the Court, in addition to 
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applying that test so that the national court has all the relevant material to enable it to determine 
whether granting the injunction in this case would be compatible with Community law. However, in 
doing so, it should, as Advocate General Gulmann advised in Clinique, not link its interpretation of 
Article 30 too closely to the particular facts of the case. I also agree with his view that under the system 
of the Treaty, [the] task of ensuring uniform application of general provisions such as those found in 
the 1976 Directive devolves on the national courts. Thus, notwithstanding the earlier willingness of the 
Court occasionally, where the evidence and information before it seemed sufficient and the solution 
clear, to settle [...] the issue itself rather than leaving the final decision for the national court, I am 
convinced that such departures from the normal division of competence between national courts and 
the Court of Justice in preliminary-reference cases are inappropriate and, in the light of the 
development at Community-law level of a test that enables the proper degree of protection of 
consumers to be determined by national courts, unnecessary. In cases such as that in the main 
proceedings, the Court should henceforth confine itself to interpreting Community law and providing 
guidelines for its application by the national court. The ultimate application of Community law and, 
thus, final decision in respect of alleged misleading or confusing product claims should be made by the 
national court.’ 
28
 Case C-313/94 Fratelli Graffione [1996] ECR I-6039. 
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Or this view from Gourmet International:29 
 
33    Second, the decision as to whether the prohibition on advertising at issue in the main 
proceedings is proportionate, and in particular as to whether the objective sought might be 
achieved by less extensive prohibitions or restrictions or by prohibitions or restrictions 
having less effect on intra-Community trade, calls for an analysis of the circumstances of 
law and of fact which characterise the situation in the Member State concerned, which the 
national court is in a better position than the Court of Justice to carry out. 
 
Or, most principled of all, the views in Costa v Enel and Shipping and Forwarding 
quoted at the beginning of this section.30 It seems as if the Court does not deny the 
essentially factual nature of proportionality assessments, it just feels that if it is 
comfortable with the facts such assessment is something it can do, is something that is 
part of interpreting the Treaty.31 
 In other cases the Court has also decided whether consumers would be 
confused by a marking on a Mars bar wrapper saying “10% extra”,32 whether a label 
provides sufficient protection from unduly strong or weak alcoholic drinks,33 and even 
what the German word “bier” really means (the Court was right – but it was still not 
an interpretation of the Treaty).34 All of these cases concerned consumer protection, 
by far the most common value to be posed against free movement of goods in the 
Cassis-type context. To some extent that makes them special. Much has been written 
on the Court’s deliberate close control of factual issues in the consumer sphere, and 
some reasonable policy justifications for this provided.35 Nevertheless, a high degree 
of control could also have been maintained by provision of carefully crafted 
principles.  
 Other areas of free movement show a similar approach. A notable non-
consumer Cassis-type case concerned a Danish recycling scheme.36 This inevitably 
imposed some burdens on importers, and the question was whether the environmental 
aims justified this. The Court reached a view that was at odds with most Danish 
opinion that specific aspects of the scheme were not necessary and so 
disproportionate. This can be understood as a controversial balancing of free trade 
against environment, but it can also be seen as a controversial assessment of how the 
scheme worked and which aspects were central to it – the facts. 
                                                 
29
 Case C-405/98 Konsumentenombudsmannen v Gourmet International Products [2001] ECR I-1795. 
30
 See text to notes 14 and 15 above. 
31
 Factors influencing how far the Court chooses to go, such as the nature of the interests at stake, 
political sensitivity, and the importance of the question, are discussed in G.De Burca ‘The principle of 
proportionality and its application in EC law’ in (1993) Yearbook of European Law (OUP). That the 
Court of Justice in practice sees itself as having an optional competence to apply proportionality is also 
supported by Jacobs ‘Recent developments in the principle of proportionality in European Community 
Law’ in E.Ellis The Principle of Proportionality in the Laws of Europe (Hart, 1999) 1-21 at 19-20, 
T.Tridimas ‘Proportionality in EC law: searching for the appropriate standard of scrutiny’, also in Ellis 
(ed), 65-84 at 78-80, and J.Jans ‘Proportionality revisited’ (2000) 27 Legal Issues of Economic 
Integration 239-265 at 255-259.  
32
 Case C-470/93 Mars [1995] ECR I-1923. 
33
 Case 120/78 Cassis de Dijon [1979] ECR 649. 
34
 Case 178/84 German Beer [1987] ECR 1227. 
35
 See e.g. S.Weatherill ‘the role of the informed consumer in European Community law and policy’ 
(1994) 2 Consumer Law Journal 49; Howells and Wilhelmsson ‘EC Consumer Law’ in Howells (ed) 
European Business Law (Dartmouth, 1996). 
36
 Case 302/86 Commission v Denmark  [1988] ECR 4607. 
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 The Court has also been keen to engage with the arcania of the organization of 
sport. In Bosman37 and Lehtonen38 it enthusiastically rolled its shirt sleeves up to 
examine the football transfer rules and rules governing professional basketball 
respectively. During an immensely long judgment in the former the Court engaged 
with the purposes of the transfer rules, their effects on young players and the creation 
of a national pool of talent, as well as their financial consequences for clubs and 
players, before concluding that the transfer system went beyond what was necessary 
for the game. It was an interpretation of that system more than of the Treaty. In the 
latter case, somewhat similarly, the Court looked at the organization of professional 
basketball. However, this time, by contrast with Bosman, on one point, to do with 
different treatment for national and foreign players, it concluded that “it is for the 
national court to ascertain the extent to which objective reasons, concerning only 
sport as such or relating to differences between the position of players from a 
federation in the European zone and that of players from a federation not in that zone, 
justify such different treatment.” Clearly the facts provided to it there were not 
enough. 
 More examples could be taken from cases concerning the legitimacy of 
reliance on a Treaty exception. Among these the Court has decided for itself what 
English law says about pornography,39 and the financial effect of free movement on 
the Dutch health service,40 as well as what UK policy toward scientologists is.41 In at 
least two of these it was flatly wrong, and the third is endlessly debatable, an 
essentially economic and political question, and almost a textbook example of a 
question where the law cannot be applied rationally without extensive factual 
research.42 
 Yet the most satisfying set of cases for the purposes here concerns selling 
arrangements. In early cases on these, when the Court still saw them as obstacles to 
movement, it had sometimes decided proportionality itself,43 and at other times stated 
this was ‘a question of fact to be determined by the national court’.44 However, that 
observation become almost redundant when in Keck, the Court seemed to find that 
selling arrangements are not obstacles to movement anyway – so proportionality 
would not need to be considered. Yet the judgment was, to put it kindly, nuanced. The 
Court stated that selling arrangements fell outside Article 28 only insofar as they had 
an equal effect on national and imported products. This proposition suggests a 
fact/law interpretation/application distinction. 
 The question is who decides when there is an unequal effect? This would seem 
to be obviously a matter for the national court. However, in a string of cases the Court 
of Justice implicitly rejected that, concluding despite evidence to the contrary that 
                                                 
37
 Case C-415/93 Bosman [1995] ECR I-4291. 
38
 Case C-176/96 Lehtonen [2000] ECR I-2681. 
39
 Case 34/79 Henn and Darby [1979] ECR 3795. 
40
 Case C-385/99 Müller-Fauré [2003] ECR I-4509; Case C-157/99 Geraets-Smits and Peerbooms 
[2001] ECR I-5473. 
41
 Case 41/74 Van Duyn [1974] ECR 1337. 
42
 See also Case C-112/00 Eugen Schmidberger [2003] ECR I-5659, where despite very abstract 
questions from the national court the Court of Justice chose to assess the facts and decide a very 
difficult socio-political point concretely. 
43
 Case C-161/91, Stoke on Trent v B & Q plc, [1992] ECR I-6635; Case C-322/89 Marchandise [1991] 
ECR I-1027; Case C-312/89 Conforama [1991] ECR I-997. 
44
 Case C-145/88 Torfaen Borough Council [1989] ECR I-3851. 
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there was no inequality of effect.45 It seemed to be juridifying the concept, removing 
its empirical content.46 Such a course of action is plainly at odds with the normal 
meaning of words – if effect is not a matter of fact what is? – and attracted great 
criticism.47 Then in Gourmet it half changed its mind, finding, following an analysis 
of the particular market and circumstances, that the rule in question did have an 
unequal effect. Thus, this clearly is not an artificial legal question. Nevertheless, the 
Court decided the point, rejecting the Commission’s view that it was for the national 
court to do so – it applied the law.48 
 A second controversial proposition in Keck was that selling arrangements of 
equal effect do not prevent access to the market. On one reading this is fairly obvious; 
if the effect is equal and access was prevented then it would be impossible to sell 
domestic goods either. Only a very select group of rules would have this consequence. 
However, until Gourmet it was not clear that equal effect was to be understood in any 
realistic way. Equality ‘in law and fact’ seemed to be fairly formalistically assessed, 
with equality in law dominating. In that case, this second proposition is troublesome. 
To find that selling arrangements generally do not prevent market access is not just a 
finding of fact, but one that has been criticized as being simply wrong. 49 Thus, while 
the Court maintained a formalistic interpretation of the Keck proviso its view of the 
effects of selling arrangements could also be seen as a disastrous foray beyond the 
legitimate interpretation of Article 28 as prohibiting measures that prevent market 
access into the applicatory fields of deciding what kind of measures those are. 
 In any case, all of the above are merely indicative. The important point is that 
building judgments around the way national rules work and their consequences, 
discussing and deciding these, is the norm. There is no sense of a court whose 
competence is in any sense confined to the Treaty. Rather it is a merely a starting 
point. Indeed, throughout all these cases a particular technique often emerges. The 
Court does often state an abstract rule of law, but instead of stopping there, and letting 
the national court use this, it then proceeds to apply that rule to the facts, in the next 
paragraph or paragraphs. It may formally use the language of hypothesis, ‘a rule such 
as’, instead of ‘this rule’, but that difference is of no more than procedural 
significance.50 In essence, it is applying the law. 
  
4.2 Competition law 
  
 In competition law there are a higher proportion of direct actions brought by 
the Commission against undertakings, in which the Court is full function; it must fact-
                                                 
45
 Case C-292/92 Hünermund [1993] ECR I-6787; Case C-391/92 Commission v Greece [1995] ECR I-
1621; Case C-69 and 258/93 Punto Casa [1994] ECR I-2355; Case C-418/93 Semararo [1996] ECR I-
2975. See also Case C-189/95 Franzen [1997] ECR I-5909 and Case C-34-36 de Agostini [1996] ECR 
I-4661, showing the first signs of a softening of the approach. 
46
 C.f. Enchelmaier, op cit. 
47
 See N.Reich ‘The November revolution of the European Court of Justice: Keck, Meng and Audi 
revisited’ (1994) 31 Common Market Law Review 459. See also S.Weatherill ‘After Keck: Some 
thoughts on how to clarify the clarification’ (1996) 33 Common Market Law Review 885; C.Barnard 
‘Fitting the remaining pieces into the goods and persons jigsaw’ (2001) 26 European Law Review 35. 
48
 See P.Koutrakos ‘On groceries, alcohol and olive oil: more free movement of goods after Keck’ 
(2001) 26 European Law Review 391-407. 
49
 See S.Weatherill ‘After Keck: some thoughts on how to clarify the clarification’ (1996) 33 Common 
Market Law Review 885-906 at 894.  
50
 It is part of a ‘formalist fiction’. To take it seriously as reflecting a division of functions would be 
‘slavish formalism’. Nevertheless it is not without political importance. All from Cohen, op cit, at 422 
and 433-4. Contra, see Snell, op cit. 
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find and decide the case. One would therefore expect that judgments under such 
actions would be more detailed and fact-oriented than those given on a reference. In 
fact such a difference is not always apparent. Whether the complaint of anti-
competitive behaviour is being adjudicated before the Court itself, or before a national 
court, it often appears to treat its role as identical. Bronner is a particularly egregious 
example, in which there is detailed consideration of the practicalities of newspaper 
distribution in Austria, and conclusions are drawn about the economics of this, which 
are highly disputable.51 That case laid down the principle that a refusal to allow a 
competitor to use an ‘essential facility’ could be an abuse of dominance. The 
essentiality or otherwise of a facility turns on practical questions such as whether it 
could be replicated by the competitor. Investigation of that, one might think, is 
precisely what the reference procedure would leave to the national court. Not in this 
case.52 
 Competition law is vulnerable to such an approach because of the increasing 
realisation that a sensible law of competition requires extensive economic and market 
analysis. Early law from the Court tended to treat matters of effect in an a priori way, 
issuing rulings on what constituted a restriction on competition that did not 
correspond to generally held views of the economic reality. As a result of intense 
criticism both it and the commission have gradually moved towards treating concepts 
such as ‘dominance’ and ‘restriction of competition’ as essentially factual, to be 
determined in conjunction with economists and industry experts.53 This is currently 
widely considered to be a good thing for the quality of the regulatory regime and so 
for competition and European economies. However, it does have as a consequence 
that one would expect a significant transfer of applicatory competence to national 
courts. Yet, perhaps partly because most actions are direct, and so the Commission 
and Court are used to competition cases being centred on economic investigation, 
there sometimes seems to be no inclination to step back from it when the point arises 
on a reference. 
 Having said that, many competition references are answered in an abstract 
way, far more so than in free movement. One reason for this may be that competition 
cases often involve quantitative issues, and to deal with these on a reference might be 
impossible, and would be an extreme assumption of national competence; a step too 
far. It is where issues are factual, but qualitative, that the lines between competences 
become difficult and vague. Such situations are likely to occur where the law provides 
a framework for balancing values – such as in free movement and sex discrimination. 
Then law and fact are intertwined. Consistently with this, many of the competition 
references where the Court seems to go furthest involve abuse of a dominant position 




 A similar lack of difference between direct and reference actions can be seen 
in the law on Article 90, the prohibition of discriminatory taxation. Here there are a 
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 Case C-7/97 Oscar Bronner [1998] ECR I-7791. 
52
 See also e.g. Case 395/87 Ministere Public v Tournier and Verney [1989] ECR 2565; Case C-179/90 
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 See Jones and Sufrin EC Competition Law (OUP, 2001) 495-504; Faull and Nikpay The EC Law of 
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number of cases discussing the concepts of ‘similar products’ or ‘indirect protection’ 
both central concepts in that article. Similarity, according to the Court, arises from a 
combination of objective characteristics and consumer substitutability. In many of the 
direct actions this has involved looking at, for example, the manufacture of particular 
drinks, their content and qualities, and how they are perceived and consumed in 
particular countries, in order to make a finding. In the rather smaller number of 
actions where similarity has arisen on a reference, the judgments read very similarly, 
with the Court asking, and answering, presumably on the basis of the file before it, the 
same questions. Analogous remarks could be made about protective effect.54 
 
4.4 Common customs tariff 
 
 What is sometimes cited as the most spectacular example of Court specificity 
is the case law concerning customs duties imposed on goods entering the 
Community.55 This has resulted in judgments of great detail, in which the Court 
considers whether a soft cotton shirt with no collar, three buttons and pictures of 
sheep is to be seen as nightwear or leisure wear, and suchlike.56 The policy 
surrounding this is particularly obvious; it seems clear that goods should pay the same 
duties whichever Member State they enter the Union through.57 Nevertheless, this 
could be achieved by having particularly precise law – which to a large extent it is - 
and the argument that the Court exceeds its competence is the same as elsewhere. An 
alternative approach would be to specify in the Treaty that all customs questions are 
to be dealt with exclusively by the Court of Justice or the Court of First Instance, 
avoiding the division of functions that applies elsewhere, and effectively creating a 
single Community customs court. 
 
5.  THE DESIRE FOR UNIFORMITY 
 
 Before looking at the practical and principled problems raised by the Court’s 
broad view, it is worth asking why it acts as it does.58 What are the reasons for folding 
application into interpretation and giving the Court control over both? There is a 
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general argument about the nature of the Court to be made, which is worth sketching 
to provide a framework, an argument about the Court’s role in the legal system, and 
then two more specific and legal arguments about preliminary references. 
 The general argument begins with Article 7 EC, which entrusts the Court, 
along with the other Community institutions, with the purposes of the Community. 
This creates an unusual situation for a court; rather than being a neutral arbiter 
between Community and Member States, as for example the American Supreme 
Court is between the Federal Government and the states, it is clearly encouraged to 
take sides. This is a sensitive point - one must be careful not to make unjustified 
accusations of bias – but it may well be fair to say that the Court does not conceive of 
itself in terms entirely analogous in their neutrality to its national equivalents. It does 
accept, to some extent, the Community mission, and that does influence its approach 
to the law.  
 Perhaps that is unfair; one could argue that all courts are partly entrusted with 
policy, in that they are entrusted with enforcing the laws designed to implement those 
policies. There is no strangeness in Article 7. Yet there does seem to be a difference in 
emphasis. The High Court, when it enforces the Financial Services Act, is achieving 
government policy in that area, but it would probably not imagine its obligation to 
that policy to go beyond the law, but rather to be entailed in it. It begins with the text, 
albeit that it may interpret that in the light of the policy. By contrast, the Court of 
Justice seems to begin with the policy goals, and then see what it can do with – or 
sometimes without - the text to achieve them.59 In that light, the approach to 
preliminary references can be seen as just another example of purposive 
interpretation. It has licence to do whatever is necessary. 
 Such a licence might even justify an attempt to reform the whole legal system. 
It is sometimes argued that this is what the Court of Justice is trying to do. By 
intervening to a high degree in national cases, and giving full answers to questions, it 
is trying to break out of the limited reference procedure and recast itself in the mould 
of an appeal court, with full competence to decide the case. This move goes in parallel 
with the limiting of other, non-reference, means of access, notably the narrow 
interpretation of individual concern to challenge Community acts.60 The ultimate 
destination is then a single path to a full-function Court, and its inauguration as the 
supreme court of Europe – at least where Community law is involved. This would be 
analogous to the role of the Federal Supreme Court in the US. The weakness of the 
argument is that many would see the Court as having that status already. On the other 
hand, clearly it could be seen – this paper argues - as having a more limited function, 
and if that is not the prevailing view, then perhaps that is an indication of the success 
of its expansionist strategy. 
The specific arguments suggest why a broad approach could be seen as 
necessary. The least convincing of these can be dealt with shortly. It locates the 
explanation for the cases above in the way questions are asked. They tend to be 
phrased very concretely, and so, it can be argued, call for concrete answers. Defenders 
of the Court point out that ‘national judges expect an answer to their question’, and 
the co-operative relationship demands that it be given. This is unconvincing. If the 
Court provides abstract rules and tells national judges to work with them, there seems 
little reason to think they will not do so; it is after all the function of a judge to apply 
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rules, and no reason to doubt their capacity to do this. If, on the other hand, the Court, 
in its answers, also considers the facts of the case to an extent that essentially 
determines the outcome, then the clear message is that such consideration falls within 
its task, and so national judges will, correctly, continue to refer each new fact set to 
the Court. While national judges could break out of this spiral by a robust 
determination themselves of what is interpretation and what is application, this 
question itself is perhaps also one of interpretation, so that correctly, if the activities 
of the Court are to be confined, it is for the Court itself to make that clear; it cannot 
then blame national courts and their questions for the concreteness of its judgments.61 
 Indeed, there is no indication that it is unhappy with such concreteness, or is 
seeking to train national courts away from it.62 The Court has even ruled that 
questions are not acceptable where they do not contain sufficient factual background 
to enable it to assess the question in context. It has also ruled that it will not answer 
hypothetical questions, and Advocates General have urged it not to answer questions 
where the Community law in point is being applied outside of a Community law 
context – for example where national law and Community law use identical terms, 
and for the sake of a consistent interpretation the national judge wants to know what 
the Community law rule would mean. The theme in all these situations is that a 
question can only be assessed and answered in its full factual context, which is clearly 
only the case if the answer is to some extent dependent upon those facts.63 It may be 
said that the Court sees its function as giving an interpretation of the facts in the light 
of the Treaty, rather than just an interpretation of the Treaty itself.64 
 A much more important reason – indeed the determining factor in the use of 
Article 234 - is the well-known desire of the Court to achieve uniformity of 
Community law.65 Abstract interpretations leave more room to the national court, and 
so create the risk that cases will be decided differently both from how the Court itself 
would do so, but also from court to court, or Member State to Member State.66  
 This is certainly a real possibility. Yet from another perspective the uniformity 
argument is very problematic. On the one hand, it must be doubtful whether 
marginalizing the function of national courts is the right way to induce them to use 
Community law properly. In any case, even if they assent to centralization of the 
assessment of facts, can the Court of Justice really cope with the work? On the other 
hand, arguments for and against limiting the freedom of individual judges to interpret 
and apply the law in the case before them bring to the fore the different legal 
traditions of the Member States, and raise the question of whether Community law is 
more common or civil, and whether blending these two risks a loss of coherence. 
These two matters are the subject of the next two sections.  
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6. CONSEQUENCES: CENTRALISATION, ALIENATION, AND JUDICIAL 
OVERLOAD 
 
If interpretation includes assessing the facts, then any new fact set can be seen 
as requiring an interpretation of the Treaty. The idea that most new fact sets merely 
require an application of existing interpretations is sidelined. Thus the number of 
potential references is hardly less than the number of potential cases where 
Community law is relevant.67 The potentially negative consequences for the workload 
of the Court of Justice are obvious. It is surprising in this context that much energy 
has been devoted to solving the problem of the Court’s slowness via structural 
rearrangements, while it seems clear that almost no structure will enable it to cope so 
long as it maintains such a broad view of its competence. Indeed, if there are now 
considerably fewer references than there are cases concerning Community law, that is 
to a large extent because lower courts have a discretion to refer, and exercise that 
discretion with an eye on cost and time – so that the more efficient the court system, 
the greater the reluctance that one might expect to refer, leading perhaps to a new 
non-uniformity of Community law, arising because of the differing degrees of 
participation of the Court in the national caseload.68 If, in the future, the Court of 
Justice were to become able to deal with cases quickly, as a result of one of the 
structural improvements so often discussed, then one could probably expect the 
number of references to increase until it was once again flooded. It seems very 
unlikely that it can ever escape overwork as long as maintains such a universal 
potential role.69 
Moreover, the references that do come are likely to be of little general interest 
– just repetitions of analytically familiar situations, solved without interesting 
reference to general principles.70 Thus the Court’s capacity to provide a unifying 
framework for the law is diminished. As well as this, each reference is clumsier and 
slower because dealing with it requires a much closer engagement with the facts – 
which the Court may not handle well.71 
 The question also arises of when exactly national courts should refer. In the 
case of courts of last instance this is reasonably clear, but in the case of lower courts, 
is the discretion absolute? Also, is that discretion to be exercised purely in the light of 
practical factors – cost and time – or is the difficulty of the point of Community law 
also something that must, as a matter of Community law, be taken in to account? In 
other words, are lower national courts allowed, or encouraged, to interpret 
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Community law themselves, or should they only not refer when the case calls for no 
more than a mechanical application of existing interpretations?72  
 Clearly they do – and may – interpret to a considerable extent themselves. 
Indeed it is this very fact which makes it necessary to make references by final courts 
compulsory,73 although this does create the paradoxical situation that courts of last 
instance are never allowed to use Community law in any creative or intelligent way, 
referring everything that is not blindingly obvious,74 while lower courts have in fact 
much wider Community law interpretative powers. Yet at the same time it seems 
implicit in the organisation of the system that the there is an interpretative quasi-
monopoly in the hands of the Court of Justice. The emphasis on uniformity of 
outcome, and the purpose of the reference procedure as an aid to this, is only coherent 
if the idea is that interpretation is in fact centrally controlled. An additional argument 
in this direction arises from CILFIT,75 in which the Court can be understood as stating 
that there are no clear points – thus implicitly all should be referred.76 
 Thus national court interpretations of Community law, while sometimes 
creative and purposive, take place in a grey area of semi-legitimacy, a sort of tolerated 
but not approved practice, where the assumption seems to be that ultimately any 
points of law will in fact make its way to the Court of Justice. Moreover, national 
final courts have no interpretative competence at all.77 This creates a difficult situation 
for the national judge. He has no obligation to refer, and if he chooses not to must 
then use Community law as intelligently as any other law, interpreting as necessary, 
but is also aware that his authority to do so is ambiguous. This must create an 
uncomfortable relationship with the law, which is likely to resolve itself either into 
defiance, 78 which may well lead to anti-Court interpretations, or a mechanical and 
unimaginative use of the law out of fear of crossing boundaries, which is bad justice, 
or in fact a reluctant referral of every point despite the cost and time involved. In 
other words national courts are alienated from Community law, and inhibited from 
good use of it. Nor do they have the chance to have their interpretations approved or 
disapproved; the Court of Justice does not examine prior national judgments in detail 
as a court of appeal would, so that there is no chance for them to build up a body of 
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approved expertise in this way. They are, as has been noted, emasculated and 
infantilised.79 
 This problem is exacerbated by the purposive nature of Community law. 
Using it correctly often requires a far more activist approach than national judges will 
be used to. In particular, proportionality assessments involve second guessing the 
legislator on the desirability and necessity of national measures, something the Court 
of Justice is comfortable with, but more conventional courts are not. Hence the 
evidence seems to be that national courts apply proportionality in disparate and often 
unsatisfactory ways, being generally less critical of national measures than the Court 
of Justice is or would be.80 This could be seen as an argument for the Court’s 
approach, showing that if it does not decide all cases uniformity is threatened 
(although in fact there could well be a fairly uniform approach throughout the 
Community – just a less Community-oriented one). However it can equally be seen as 
a result of that approach. By deciding each case in a common law way, on the facts, 
without principled explanation of what it is doing, the Court minimises the general 
usefulness of its judgments. It issues endless decrees that this measure is necessary 
and proportionate while that one is not, without explicitly unpacking its legal process 
to any extent. It does not, in short, explain in any detail exactly what proportionality 
is, and how it should be applied, beyond the basic three steps that every textbook 
contains. An abstract filling in of what is to be understood by ‘necessity’ or third-
stage ‘proportionality’ and the processes that a national judge should go through to 
discover these, is precisely the sort of thing that could be seen as interpreting the 
Treaty and would be of great use to national judges that are not prepared to simply 
replace the legislators’ assessment of what needs to be done in a particular aim with 
their own, but who would be prepared to follow a clearly defined and more law-like 
set of steps to review legislation.81 
 What this indicates is that the crossing of the boundaries of interpretation is 
not merely a usurping of the national court’s function, but also undermines the Court 
of Justice’s own; by becoming concrete, it fails to be general, and so does not give the 
guidance for which it is employed. It is the difference between, as the adage would 
have it, giving a fish, and teaching to fish.82  
 
7. CULTURAL ORIGINS 
 
 A picture of the reference procedure in purely pragmatic colours misses much. 
It, and the way the Court views it, are products of the practices and ideologies of the 
Member States. Looking through the lens of the civil law and the common law, as 
well as a comparison of the procedure with national cassation casts a gently 
illuminating light, not so much providing solutions to problems as highlighting the 
background to them.  
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 The discussions below are not intended to represent the views of typical 
continental or UK (or Irish) lawyers. There must be few individuals, and there are 
certainly no systems, that are pure embodiments of the doctrine they hold most dear. 
Rather the common law and civil law have been merging and converging for 
centuries. Yet in all the resulting mixtures two sources of dogma can be identified, 
two concepts of the law and its function, and these idealised philosophies continue to 
be important in the explanations and justifications of each system. Considering the 
preliminary reference procedure from these perspectives, while it may not correspond 
to actual opinions held, may still help indicate how the streams of the common and 
civil law have come to reach a new and unique blend in the law of the Community.  
 
7.1 A civil law view 
 
Law and judgments are quite clearly separate in civil law doctrine, and the uniformity 
of law consists in the application of identical abstract rules in all courts. The 
interpretation and application of that law is decentralised to individual judges, who do 
not formally allow themselves to be influenced by how other judges are deciding 
similar cases.83 Indeed, to do so could be seen as at odds with the idea of judicial 
independence. Yet that autonomous interpretation and application is not seen as 
threatening the uniformity of the law – since judgments are not law. The risk of 
unequal application of the law is minimised by appeals, and by a common training 
process for judges. A significant amount of the legitimacy of most civil law derives 
from acceptance of the institutions of the legal process.84  
 A classical civil lawyer would not then see any risk to the uniformity of 
Community law in allowing national courts to apply it freely, and insofar as he was 
concerned by differing outcomes he might look to a solution in common educational 
processes – something that has a considerable academic following on the continent. 
He would be trying to create a common conceptual framework in the minds of 
lawyers, a common dogmatic system. His underlying vision is of law as abstract 
propositions, which might well lead to a view of its understanding and interpretation 
as a process of restatement in other, also abstract terms. Then he would be inclined to 
see the Court of Justice as often doing far more than merely interpret. 
 Yet the civil lawyer would come across a troubling paradox if this were not 
the case. If the Court of Justice were to provide abstract interpretations, then it would 
become a legislator. This follows because its answers are, necessarily if the Article 
234 procedure is not to be comical, binding in the case. However, if its statements are 
general, then obviously they represent generally applicable propositions,85 and given 
their binding nature, are essentially new laws.86 The function of the Court would then 
be to lay down new rules within the limits of the Treaty, a function that is analytically 
indistinguishable from the function of a legislator that lays down new rules within the 
function of a constitution or rules of procedure. The only difference may lie in the 
tightness of those constraints, but in fact, as is well known, and as a glance at the 
language of the Treaty will show, the constraints imposes on the freedom of the Court 
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of Justice are, at most, not uncomfortably tight. In fact, in the sense that the Treaty 
gives the Court of Justice the monopoly on interpreting what its own powers of 
interpretation are, it is considerably freer than most traditional legislators. 
 Yet the concept of the court as rule-maker is one that is most alien and 
repugnant to civil law systems. The more civil they are, the more they hold fast to the 
doctrine that a court merely decides a case, it does not lay down new rules.87 A purely 
interpretative function, where interpretation is understood abstractly, must be 
abhorrent to the civil law. Thus the paradox is that if Community law is to be seen as 
following in the civil law tradition, guided by its principles, and thus conceiving of 
law as abstract, then it is also alien to the civil law, because it makes its courts into 
legislators.88 
 There are two ways out. One is just to shrug and accept that Community law is 
civil only in parts – although given the value placed on overall coherence in civil law 
systems, ‘partly civil’ is almost as troublesome a concept as ‘fairly unique’. Another 
is to ask whether the act of measuring facts against legal principles can also be seen as 
interpretation of those principles. If that is the case, then the meaning of the law – for 
interpretation is surely about discovering meaning – lies in the results of specific 
cases; but that is a reasonable working definition of the common law. 
 
7.2 A common law view 
 
The common law lawyer should therefore be the most comfortable with the 
Court of Justice. His traditional view, no doubted rooted in the bog of Anglo-Saxon 
common sense, that abstract rules determine nothing, and the law is only discovered 
by looking at what has been decided in individual cases, and proceeding by analogy 
therefrom, the inductive approach, will lead him to consider that the only sensible and 
meaningful way of interpreting a Treaty is simply to use it; to look at each case on its 
merits, make a decision, and leave posterity and lawyers to pronounce the principles 
which with time will surely emerge. Accordingly, one might expect little criticism of 
the Court’s methodology in English literature, and little there has been. 
 However, the common lawyer should still be unhappy with the division of 
functions, because his conception of interpretation is that it is application; the division 
of the two is precisely what he, if true to his stereotype, will reject as foreign and 
wrong.89 For him, Article 234 of the Treaty, at least as interpreted by the Court, is 
incoherent. He is happy with the practice, but not the principle behind it. 
 For the common lawyer the issue is really one of quality. He wants a 
precedent, which requires a judgment containing a fully argued analysis of the facts. 
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When the Court provides one of its simplistic descriptions of the effects of a measure 
on competition or free movement, it fails to give that. From his perspective it just 
looks like a second-rate court.90 
 Thus he will be in a state of permanent frustration, and more than his civil law 
colleague will feel that Community law is permanently unclear, or in a mess. He is 
therefore likely to be a rich source of references. Given the lack of detail in Court of 
Justice judgments, he is likely to find again and again that there is insufficient 
precedent to decide his case. Of course, he may find the national court interpretation 
acceptable, but he will rarely find a reference inappropriate. Whereas his civil law 
colleague may really wonder what the merit is in asking for yet another repetition of 
the same old principles, the common lawyer will see the uniqueness of his set of facts, 
and thus the potential of a new question for the Court. The common lawyer, if the 
same robust sense that gave him the common law did not also incline him to a respect 
for considerations of cost and time, could be a dangerously rich source of workload. 
 
7.3 Comparing with domestic reference procedures 
 
Blurring law and fact is not unique to Community law. It occurs to varying 
extents in national reference systems as well, despite their adherence to a similar 
interpretation/application division of functions. Yet the problems arising seem to be 
somewhat less, to judge by the stability and wide acceptance of those systems. 
Although the structure has been transplanted, it looks as if the new context makes 
different demands, and there are features of the Community system which impose 
stresses that do not arise nationally.91  
One of these is the lack of competence of the Court of Justice to interpret 
national law.92 An important difference between similar national procedures and the 
Community one is that the national court of cassation or constitutional review will be 
competent to interpret all aspects of the law before it. Where a statute may conflict 
with the constitution, it is competent to authoritatively determine what the constitution 
requires, but also what the statute means. By contrast, the Court of Justice does not 
have competence to interpret national law. If the question referred to it concerns a 
possible conflict between national and Community measures, it must – or should - 
accept the national court’s assessment of what the national law says and means. This 
follows partly from attribution; the Treaty allows the Court of Justice to interpret the 
Treaty, but says nothing about it interpreting conflicting national measures. It is also a 
matter of common sense. Context is important to interpretation, and given the 
diversity of legal systems in the Community the most authoritative view on what 
national law says and entails must come from the courts of the system where it 
resides. The Court of Justice lacks the relevant experience and knowledge to come to 
an adequate assessment. So unlike the national context, which enables legal points to 
be fully handled by the higher court – and so also allows for the highly specific and 
terse judgments of the French Courts, which avoid the problem of legislating through 
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abstract answers93 - the Community system makes the answering of questions of 
Community law a co-operative venture, in which the resources of the courts on both 
sides of the reference are necessary.  
 Another factor is that national systems all have some form of docket control 
in place, which prevents reference becoming an unreasonable centralisation of 
decision making.94 In some cases, such as with the German Constitutional Court, only 
questions of a certain type, constitutional questions, are referred. Most court cases do 
not involve constitutional issues, and so this narrows the range of possible references. 
By contrast, while Community law can certainly be compared with an emerging 
constitution in academic argument, it is far more broad-ranging than most 
constitutions, now embracing issues of trade, social policy, and even crime, often on a 
detailed and technical level. Referring points of Community law entails referring 
points from a far greater group of domestic legal actions. When one considers that the 
source group for references is the whole community, and thus far greater than within a 
single nation, it is apparent that the demands made on a constitutional court with a 
reference procedure are not comparable to those potentially made on the Community 
court. Other systems, such as the Dutch and French, use cassation for appeals on any 
point of law, thus do have the broad range of reference. However, they do this on 
appeal, so that there is already a judgment in place.95 This must reduce the impetus to 
go to cassation. Not only does the presence of a judgment give a certain finality - 
most cases are not appealed; most judges are right most of the time – but this 
tendency is reinforced by the fact that the national judge in interpreting national law 
has an authority that the national judge interpreting Community law does not. Even if 
a national court has issued a judgment, and the question of a reference comes up 
during an appeal against that, so that the reference can be seen as essentially an appeal 
against the earlier national interpretation of Community law, the motivation for such a 
reference is greater than the motivation to an equivalent appeal to a national court of 
cassation on a point of national law in proportion to the extent that national judges are 
seen to be masters of national law more than of Community law. Their view simply 
does not count for as much in the Community law context – and, it is suggested, they 
are more likely to be wrong. 
 Finally, the need for clear divisions of function in the national processes is not 
as great within the Community system, not merely for functional reasons, but for 
political ones. Who assesses and interprets the facts, the lower court or the court of 
cassation or review, is neither a question of subsidiarity, politics, nor national 
autonomy when the procedure is domestic. There is no question of local legal culture 
and practice being misunderstood, nor of foreign values being imposed. In short, all 
the reasons which led to the need for division of functions in the Community context 
are absent. 
 
7.4 The Community blend 
 
 Although structurally the Court owes most to French law, it has never adopted 
the very abbreviated style characteristic of higher courts in that system.96 Rather, for 
understandable reasons, it has chosen to adopt a relatively discursive, explanatory, 
                                                 
93
 See note 88 above. 
94
 See Snell, op cit, at 184-185.  
95
 Ibid, especially the point that a decision on cassation is easier than one on a reference, because much 
of the work of factual analysis and organization is already done in the lower court’s judgment. 
96
 Lasser, op cit, at 36. See note 88 above. 
 24 
educatory style, and to create precedents, examples, and to root law in fact and 
outcome rather than abstractions. This is part of an attempt to create the certainty and 
consistency and clarity that is the strength of common law/precedential systems. It 
also allows the incremental, reactive change that is another of their virtues. 
 Yet the common law is also unwieldy and labour intensive. It works because it 
is a collective enterprise, in which courts at all levels share the task of developing the 
law, and there is a multi-directional, constant, dialogue between them all, through 
precedent and the art of distinguishing. This multipolarity gives it its organic, 
evolutionary and incremental character, and provides the manpower to build up the 
dense network of implicit rules that are its key. 
 One court cannot do all that, and should not do all that. The common law spirit 
demands more dialogue and response. In the Community context we may call it 
subsidiarity, but if law is to be made by courts then national courts must also have a 
role in the development of the whole. It is the Court’s failure to develop a conceptual 
framework that allows this, while still preserving its role as the unifying force that any 
supreme court must be, that stops Community law either taking root, or developing 
the richness of jurisprudence that it might. It denies others a role, without being able 
to fully fill that gap itself.  
 
8. REGULATORY COMPETITION BETWEEN LEGAL SYSTEMS 
 
The parallel between the judicial division of competences and the analogous division 
in positive law-making is striking. Also there, the Community interprets its own 
competences almost open-endedly. It is not that it leaves nothing to the Member 
States, but that their activities are conditional; there is no guarantee that the 
Community will not act in the same sphere, and take precedence.97 Thus in reality, 
almost all competences are shared. This was strikingly evidenced in the proposed 
constitution, where after some doctrinal wrangling it was realised that the internal 
market could only be seen as a shared competence.98 Yet the internal market is itself 
hardly well defined, touching on almost every area of life.  
 In the judicial sphere it is perhaps harder for the Community to invade 
national powers. The national court initiates, and so in a sense is the master of the 
reference procedure, and also of the case in which it takes place. The Court of Justice 
is not in a position to directly prevent this; ultimately national courts could always 
fight back. Yet courts are obedient, and one cannot expect a duel. In practice, if the 
Court defines away the national court role in Community law, it is likely to achieve 
this result. 
 This disturbs the broader functioning of the Community and the internal 
market. Even though the desire of the Community not to limit itself is consistent with 
its purposive and changing nature, and ambiguity has been a traditional and 
sometimes constructive tool in the integration process,99 the uncertainty it causes also 
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functions to inhibit the creativity and dynamism of the Member States, and so 
ultimately of the Community itself. Centralisation is not good resource management. 
 In the jargon of the time, the consistent tension is between regulatory 
competition, subsidiarity, and the virtues of local democracy, on the one side, and 
uniformity on the other.100 Obviously a balance is necessary. However, to achieve this 
balance a degree of protection of the more vulnerable national level is necessary. That 
means, in this context, a principled division of functions between courts. At the 
moment, local autonomy is a refugee, without legal home. National courts have no 
intelligent part to play in Community law.  Yet given the low standard of much of the 
Court of Justice’s self-expression (no doubt a language problem) and the need in an 
integrating Europe for legal systems to understand each other better, and the need for 
the law itself to adapt to the environment in which it finds itself, this rejection of 
national judicial resources is a waste. 
In the internal market this is particularly the case. Courts and legal systems are 
of great importance to economic activity, and their efficiency influences economic 
success. They could, in consequence, be seen as possible arenas for competition, and 
Community law would provide a mechanism for containing this within a common 
framework, preventing it becoming a race to deregulate, but rather becoming a race to 
administer the law well. Thus same principles would be applied in different courts, 
and efficiency and quality of interpretation would be factors influencing location and 
behaviour of economic actors, and so determining success in the market for law. This 
is a fascinating, and no doubt economically desirable, chance to explore empirically 
the merits of different systems – a sort of laboratory experiment in which Community 
law provides the common element placed in a diversity of circumstances. For Europe 
as a whole it is a chance to negotiate its way slowly towards a court system, perhaps a 
common courts system, that combines the best of them all, and results in efficient 
regulation of the Union as a whole. 
 
9. REFERENCE V APPEALS 
 
A simple reference procedure is not the right one for the Community. It is far too 
centralising, and can only function if answers are abstract. Yet in a Community with 
such cultural differences abstraction may not be enough to ensure sufficiently uniform 
application. Moreover, as Community law spreads into ever new areas the concept of 
the reference becomes ever more insulting; it is as if a national judge was told that he 
had better ask advice whenever a point of contract, criminal law, tort or property law 
arose, and not just decide it himself. A logical step is to move to an appeal structure. 
Much has been written on this,101 so discussion here is confined to advantages and 
disadvantages relevant to the topic in hand.  
It would not be necessary to put the Court of Justice at the end of the appeals 
process, after all national remedies have been exhausted. Appeal could be possible at 
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any stage after the first judgment – or perhaps after the first appeal.102 However the 
key point would be the appeal would be from a decision, and the Court of Justice 
would be expected to review and approve or disapprove that decision. This could be – 
it is suggested should be - in a cassation form, where the Court would not provide a 
replacement judgment, but confine itself to indicating where things had gone wrong, 
and referring the matter back to the national court for redecision.  
The advantages are several. Firstly, Community law is always interpreted and 
applied in full by national courts first, providing quicker use of the law, and giving 
national courts practice. Secondly, that national use of the law is then reviewed by the 
Court of Justice, thus providing feedback to the national court, but also information 
on the law, and on the behaviour of their peers, to courts in other Member States, 
something that will encourage cross-border legal communication and convergence of 
interpretations.103  
The function of the Court of Justice would be largely the same; it would 
consider points of Community law. Thus the same questions of interpretation and 
application, and abstraction and concreteness could arise. However the role of 
national courts would be made more central to the system and this would render the 
respect for these lines less vital. Moreover, if forced to build its judgments around 
those of the national court, to respond to them, the Court of Justice would find it 
harder to impose its own view of the facts. Thus national courts’ control of their 
proper domain would be strengthened. The power of the first word, and of the full 
explanation, is considerable.  
At the moment it is also the case that references often come to the court at a 
stage of proceedings where national judgments have been given. However, the Court 
rarely considers these in any depth. It responds far more fully to the arguments of the 
parties and the Commission – although not always to these. It clearly feels that these 
have something to contribute to the adjudication, where its judicial colleagues in the 
Member State do not. That perception would have to change on cassation. 
The disadvantage of appeals, it is sometimes said, is that it would damage the 
co-operative relationship between courts and replace it with a hierarchical one. This 
seems somewhat unrealistic. The very limited amount of challenge that the Court of 
Justice has experienced over the years, despite its purposive and sometimes 
incoherent rulings, suggests that national courts do already treat it as their hierarchical 
superior within the realm of Community law, and indeed it is that. An appeal structure 
would be a more honest reflection of how things already are.104 Nor would it threaten 
the ability of national courts to decide cases, at least if appeal was by cassation, or the 
dominance of national courts over national law. The Court of Justice would simply 




This paper is not a call for abstract judgments as such. It is more a taking note of the 
fact that very concrete judgments and a reference procedure are a bad combination. 
Part of the solution to that should lie in less concreteness – the Court must learn to 
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trust and let go a little, not just in the cause of decentralisation, but also in its own 
cause of teaching national courts to use Community law. The time when leading by 
the nose was appropriate, if that ever was, is past. 
 However, there is also much to be said for the common law habit of 
discovering law in the facts, and rendering the story prior to the principle. It is the 
story that makes the law clear to non-lawyers, renders, if enough stories are told, the 
outcomes of cases certain, and also makes judges and courts accountable. Thus there 
should also be a role for a Supreme Court of Community Law that can review 
judgments, or judge cases, as a whole, and is not confined to the Treaty text. Certainly 
the tendency of the Court of Justice to treat its jurisdiction over the cases referred to it 
so broadly indicates that it hungers for full involvement. Then the task is to allow that 
involvement in a way that does not deprive the involvement of the national court, that 
also allows them to interpret and part-own Community law. 
 Fears of loss of unity if changes are made are probably exaggerated. There is 
already no control over what happens in courts that choose not to refer, and while the 
Court’s style gives it much control over those who do, its lack of generality minimises 
the broader impact of its judgments. A different approach would increase uniformity 
in some ways, decrease it in others, and probably have no apocalyptic effect. 
 What it would do is chime with the direction of the Community and of law 
generally. The choice to make directives the major legislative tool, as well as the 
increasing attention given to complex and often troublesome matters like closer-co-
operation, minimum harmonisation, and the use of framework directives are all signs 
of the recognition that there cannot be absolute uniformity for all. A single 
homogenous legal system is neither desirable nor practical. In these solutions a choice 
is made to opt for a common framework of principle, and then to allow divergence 
and diversity within defined bounds. 
 So is it with a more abstract approach to interpretation, and a system of 
cassation. The real work is left to national courts, and the Court functions rather like 
the European Court of Human Rights, perhaps sometimes laying down an important 
new principle, but often simply supervising the margin of appreciation. 
 Many words could be picked to summarise all this; subsidiarity, or regulatory 
competition, or efficiency in the use of resources. However, the key element is 
decentralisation. The Court’s current behaviour is profoundly centralising. Yet it sits 
now not as sole owner and operator of an additional and confined legal system, that it 
may legitimately monopolise, but at the centre of a whole new multi-faceted 
European legal order. It needs to ask itself how much of the function of that order can 
reasonably be centralised in a single court.  
 Certainly, if it wishes to be seen as a true constitutional court, with the status 
and respect that are often accorded to these, then self-restraint will be a far more 
effective path than un-legal policy-led ad-hoc interventionism. Just as a central 
function of constitutions is to allocate power, a central function of constitutional 
courts is to protect that allocation, even at the cost of sometimes denying their own 
role and influence. They must not be concerned purely with substantive policy, but 
also with the system they protect, and the rights of other players in it. Thus they must 
be ready to deny themselves power to rule, to decide not to decide, where the 
constitution gives that power to other courts – even if, precisely when, those other 
courts may decide differently. It is concern with such questions, and the readiness to 
self-denial that must go along with it, that makes them constitutional.    
 Finally, one should place the Court in the context of the times. This is an age 
of movement away from hierarchy and central control, towards local autonomy and 
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individual freedom. There is little market for control any more, but rather for 
empowerment. Management, of individuals, groups, companies, and countries, is 
achieved more by manipulation and ideas, and less by compulsion. As in society, as in 
economics, so in law. 
 
